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Forty years of stressful history would challenge the capacity
of any international agreement on trade and commerce to cope with
new developments and practices not well contemplated by the
original draftsmen. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 2 is no exception.
Indeed, the lack of adequate institutional structure for the
GATT3 renders it even more vulnerable than many agreements to the
problem of "relevance" in a world now substantially different
from the one of its time of origin. Yet few practices have posed
as large a problem for the policy objectives and rule language of
GATT as those generally called "Voluntary Export Arrangements",
"Voluntary Restraint Arrangements" or "Export Restraint
Arrangements", (VER's, VRA's, ERA's, etc.). Despite extensive
economic and policy criticism suggesting that ERA's are usually a
fourth or fifth best choice4 (or worse) as a trade policy
measure, these arrangements have proliferated to such an extent
in world economic affairs that it appears that some nations
prefer them to all other trade restraining devices. Why this is
so has been the subject of comment elsewhere. 5  Clearly it
relates, inter alia, to the national constitutional structures of
governments which inhibit the use of other measures (such as
tariffs or quantitative restrictions, which may sometimes require
parliamentary action or prerequisites specified in legislative
delegations of power). Italso relates to international rules
such as that of GATT Article XIX (escape clause) which requires
3
an import restraining nation to "compensate" exporting countries
with added trade concessions.
While the economic and other policy considerations
surrounding the use of ERA's have been explored amply, there is
remarkably little analytical examination of the related legal
question of whether the ERA's are consistent with GATT
obligations. Yet those legal questions can have considerable
impact on the policy debate, as well as on the negotiating
context of an attempt to revise the rules. It is the purpose of
this article, responding to a request to that effect, to analyze
this legal question -- namely, the GATT consistency of ERA's.
The policy and economics of the use of these measures will be
largely left to other works.
An answer to this legal question turns out to be rather
complex. There are a number of different types of ERA's, and the
GATT consistency of some of these differs from that of others.
In addition, certain circumstances offer legal escapes for the
use of ERA's which in other situations may not be GATT
consistent. In sum, there is no simple overall answer. "It
depends ... " is the best that can be said.
First it is necessary to explore some of the different
characteristics of ERA's (Part I, below). Then the analysis will
turn to non-government measures largely escaping GATT discipline
(Part II), followed by a look at governmental measures (Part
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III). After this the most significant GATT potential exception
(the escape clause) will be explored (Part IV), followed by a
brief look at other exceptions (Part V) and concluding with some
final remarks (Part VI).
In this discussion we will always assume that all relevant
participating governments are members or "contracting parties" to
the GATT.
I. EXPORT RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS
A. Different Types of ERA's
A number of different types of measures create restraints on
exports from an exporting country, which can be considered under
the overall concept of "export restraint arrangement". Common to
all of these is that the restraints on trade are primarily
imposed or regulated by or within the exporting country. In the
terminology often used in international trade meetings in recent
years, these are called "grey area" measures, suggesting that
they may not always be clearly inconsistent with international
rules (such would presumably be "black"), but that they do not
live up to the basic policy goals of the international economic
system.
The principal classification of importance is the distinction
between those measures imposed by the exporting country
government, and those imposed or effectuated totally by
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non-government entities, such as enterprises or trade
associations.
The non-government ERA's could include agreements, whether
explicit or implicit (tacit) between industry groups in the
exporting and the importing countries. Various subtle approaches
have also been observed, such as "predictions" of export trends.
The government measures can include explicit government-to-
government agreements (usually technically in treaty form) in
which the exporting government agrees to limit exports to the
other country to certain ways. In U.S. law and in some other
countries these are termed "Orderly Marketing Agreements" or
"OMA's". 6 In some cases, a government on one side may explicitly
agree with a non-government group on the other side (industry
sector association, or group of firms, etc.) such that exports
are restrained. The government might be that of the exporting
country, or it might be that of the importing country. In most
cases the agreement is deemed "informal" and not legally binding.
Finally, government measures can be informal or tacit. In
such cases the usual pattern seems to be for the exporting
country's government to make some sort of "statement" or
explanation of intent, by which it will seek to assure that
exports of a certain product to another country will be kept
under certain limits. The Japanese restraints on auto exports to
the U.S. market are a prime example. 7
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B. Reasons for the Use of ERA's
Why are these measures so attractive to governments and their
trade policy officials? There are several reasons, some already
alluded to. Informal measures often escape various restraints of
national or international law. Thus a government, which under
its constitution or statutory law had no formal authority to
enter into an explicit international agreement, may find it
feasible and reasonably effective to have an implicit or informal
arrangement for the foreign limitation of exports. This allows
both governments concerned to avoid the necessity of implementing
legislation or complicated procedures (often requiring time
delay, as well as rigidities on the power to remove the measures
in the future). Furthermore, the possibility of "negotiating"
ERA's on a selective rather than a Most Favored Nation (M.F.N.)
basis is sometimes felt to be useful. 8 Finally, it also tacitly
allows avoidance of the GATT escape clause compensation
requirement. 9
The government of the exporting country may cooperate in an
ERA for various reasons. First, such government may expect that
such an arrangement, similar to an export cartel, will be
"profitable". Economists have noted that the "monopoly rents" of
a ERA are often captured by the exporting nation, and may
function partly as a replacement to the compensation requirement.
Secondly, the exporting country can be coerced by the government
7
of the importing country through threats of other forms of
safeguard measures that would be more harmful to it. Finally, it
can be persuaded or coerced to cooperate for non-trade policy
reasons. 10
II. NON GOVERNMENT MEASURES
If governments do not participate in an ERA measure, there is
very little exposure to a claim of GATT inconsistency. For
example, if the ERA measure is an explicit or tacit agreement or
"arrangement" by which the exporting firms in one country
restrain their exports to a particular country -- possibly on the
request of competing industry groups in the potential importing
country -- arguably the GATT does not cover the arrangement. The
GATT does not normally purport to regulate non-government or
private firm behavior. 1 1 The general purpose and thrust of GATT
is to restrain government interference on international trade, so
as to leave private firms the maximum freedom of choice about
business matters, pursuant to market oriented principles.
Non-government activity, however, can create a great risk of
exposure to the national laws of competition of an importing
country. Without government involvement, there may be little or
no opportunity to use a defense to an importing country's
anti-trust law which would be allowed for "government compulsion"
or "act of state". 1 2
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This is particularly the case of exports directed to the
United States. Thus a non-government ERA restraining trade
destined for the U.S. is very risky indeed.1 3 However, as a
matter of international law, there is little that constrains this
behavior. Thus, for importing countries which do not have
anti-trust or other significant laws on competition,
non-government ERA's may escape inconsistency with GATT rules and
with national laws.
This points up an important lacuna in the current
international economic rule structure. Although the draft
International Trade Organization Charter (ITO) 1 4 contained a
chapter devoted to the subject of inappropriate anti-competitive
behavior of private firms, that charter never came into force. 1 5
In 1960 the Contracting Parties made a determination that it
would be inappropriate to try to bring under its authority this
category of questions. 1 6 Since then other international
organizations have tried to develop international rules of
private firm behavior which would fill in this gap, but so far
none of these operate with any binding character. 1 7
III. GOVERNMENTAL ERA'S AND GATIT OBLIGATIONS
Turning to ERA' s that involve government action, two basic
types of arrangements must be evaluated: Those which impose
quantitative restraints; and those (similar to part of the US -
9
Japan chips agreement) which involve price limits or floors.
A. Quantitative Restrictions of Exports
1. Article XI: Prohibition of the Use of Quotas or
Other Measures by the Exporting Country
When the government acts explicitly to restrain exports to a
particular country, then the risk of inconsistency with GATT
rules is apparent. The most obvious provision of GATT relating
to ERA measures is that of Article XI paragraph 1, which reads:
"No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation ...
or on the exportation of any product ... "
Most ERA's constitute such restrictions and, therefore, appear to
be contrary to this provision.
Difficulties may arise when some ERA measures, although
non-government in form, may closely approximate government
action. A government may merely "encourage the voluntary
restraint" of its exporting firms, and argue that the measure is
essentially non-governmental in character. Some might argue that
Japanese "administrative guidance" approaches this
characterization. Other governmental approaches might tacitly
condition certain government benefits (e.g. access to capital,
10
sympathetic "regulatory" decisions, tax measures, etc.) on
"patriotic compliance" with a request to restrain exports.
This then raises a troublesome question as to which
government activity becomes a measure recognized by the GATT
rules as "governmental". GATT Article XI speaks of "other
measures", and thus has within it the potential, in the hands of
a GATT or other disputes -panel with "creative inclinations", of a
determination that informal governmental measures are
nevertheless contrary to GATT.
Another difficulty of ERA's under Article XI may be their
effects on competition. In 1950 the Contracting Parties
unanimously approved a Working Party report on Article XI which
concluded that "where export restrictions were in fact intended
for the purpose of avoiding competition among exporters and not
for the purpose set out in the exception provisions of Articles
XI and XX, such restrictions were inconsistent with the
provisions of the Agreement".1 8  This early approach, however,
must be viewed in the context of the above mentioned 1960 GATT
determination not to bring into GATT competence questions of
anti-competition policy. In 1950 there still remained a hope
that an ITO charter would come into being. In 1960, this hope
had long since disappeared.
2. Article XIII: Discriminatory ERA' s and the
Importing Country' s Obligation
11
Article XIII contains a non-discrimination obligation for
the allocation of quotas, including those that are exempted from
the Article XI general prohibition of the use of quantitative
restrictions. 1 9 Under this provision quotas should be applied in
such a way that the importation of the like product of all third
countries or the exportation of the like product to third
countries should be similarly prohibited or restricted, based on
historical or "normal" patterns of trade allocation. 2 0
Unless a case involves one or more exporting countries which
create particular difficulties because of a dynamic and
unforeseen increase in exports, it seems likely that the
importing country will seek to protect its domestic industry
against all the suppliers and that it therefore will have an
incentive to act on a non-discriminatory basis. An example of
this may be the 1984-85 VRA's on steel shipments to the U.S.
which attempted to include all the major suppliers.
Nevertheless, several difficulties may arise.
First, it may be that certain exporting countries will not
accept ERA's. Secondly, it is possible that all the exporting
countries are subject to ERA's, but that the conditions in the
separate bilateral agreements with the importing country differ
significantly. Such differences may result in ERA's that could
be contrary to Article XIII.
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In any event, the use of ERA's may attract the analysis of
Article XIII in some situations where the importing country's
heavy hand suggests that the ERA's are not "voluntary", and that
discrimination results from the importing nations actions, adding
another exposure of GATT challenge to ERA practice.
3. Other Interpretations of Article XI
It has been argued that, although government ordained ERA's
may fall under a literal reading of the prohibitions of Articles
XI these provisions, as far as the export restrictions are
concerned, may have been written merely in order to protect other
countries from export controls that would limit their supplies. 2 1
When the importing country to which the exports were directed
itself instigated the restrictions in order to safeguard its
domestic industry, it would not need such protection against
limitations of its supplies. Under this line of reasoning, the
Article XI prohibition of the use of quotas to restrict exports
should not apply to the ERA case we are examining here. 2 2
There are, however, few reasons to suppose that the
prohibition in Article XI of export quotas is as limited in scope
as only to protect supplies of other countries. It is also
possible that the contracting parties did not link the
prohibition of quota to a specific purpose, but wanted to
prohibit the use of quantitative restrictions in general,
irrespective of the possible purposes of the action, because
13
quotas (i) are relatively non-transparent, (ii) create too much
uncertainty for exporters, (iii) cannot be "overcome" by greater
efficiency by the producer-exporter. The 1960 GATT determination
mentioned above reinforces this view. 2 3
B. ERA's Establishing Floor Prices
A few ERA's have been designed to prevent exports to one or
more foreign markets below a certain floor price. Obviously this
would offer competitive benefits to importing country producers,
possibly even benefitting their exports to third markets or the
competing downstream industries (since parts would be just as
costly to foreign downstream competitions). The wording of
Article XI seems broad enough to capture this practice, unless
the price is maintained by use of an export tax, charge, or duty.
The "other measures" language assists this argument. Likewise,
the Article I and XIII non-discrimination rules could be invoked
in the case of selective price floor ERA's. 2 4  Of course, as
noted below, some of these arrangements may have a separate GATT
justification. In particular, some of these arrangements may be
justified as "settlement" agreements in unfair practices
proceedings such as dumping or subsidy cases, sometimes called
"price undertakings.
C. Enforcement: Who Will Complain?
The discussion above suggests that a government imposed
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measure restraining exports can be contrary to GATT. In fact,
there seems to be little doubt that (contrary to statements
sometimes made in speeches or the literature) governmental ERA
measures are often prima facie inconsistent with GATT. Perhaps
GATT exceptions can be found to square the measures with the
GATT, but that is a separable question (discussed in other
sections below.) Thus, the initial indication is that most
VRA's, OMA's etc are inconsistent with Article KI or other.
articles of the GATT.
The problem comes, however, in exploring the consequences of
such breach of GATT. Two aspects of this can be explored: The
rights and obligations of the two countries which are "parties"
to the export restrain arrangement; and those of third parties.
1. As Between the Parties or Participants in the ERA
Who will complain? The government imposing the ERA measures
is surely unlikely to complain against its own activity in GATT.
The government of the country to which the restrained exports are
otherwise destined is very likely to have been the seeker of the
ERA measures, requesting the restraints as a "safeguard" measure
to alleviate "injury" to its own competing industry. Thus a
dilemma of the GATT rule, is the question of enforcement.
If the ERA is embodied in a legally binding instrument (which
would be a "tre aty" under international law de finitions ), this
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agreement itself, as between its parties, may prevent any "GATT
liability" of the parties towards each other. This is because
the ERA agreement is later in time, and as between the parties to
both it and the GATT, the later in time prevails under
traditional international treaty law. 2 5 It can be argued that
even if the later treaty was illegal because incompatible with
the multilateral treaty, this would only involve liability toward
third parties and not between the ERA participants.
A counter argument may exist, however. According to
international law, parties cannot bilaterally derogate from a
multilateral treaty, if such would be "incompatible with the
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a
whole". 2 6 The possibility of discriminating among countries
through the use of ERA's, or of concealing actions contrary to
general multilateral policies of "transparency" could arguably
cause such incompatibility. 2 7 The counter-counter argument is
that GATT does not apply as long as there is no effect on third
parties. 2 8
It is possible that in some (probably very few) cases, the
domestic law of either the exporting country or the importing
country of the participants in an ERA measure would be so
structured as to allow challenge to the measures or government
activity by some private party who (such as an importing or
exporting establishment) argues that it has been harmed. This
was nearly (but not quite) the 1970's U.s. case of Consumers
16
Union v. Kissinger. 2 9
2. Third Party Complaint
A nation (member of GATT) who is not in any way a participant
of the ERA measure could, of course, complain. It would have
some hurdles to get over. For example, if it brought a complaint
in GATT under GATT Article XXIII, it technically needs to show
"... that any benefit accruing to it ... is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement
is being impeded .... ". The mere inconsistency of an ERA with
GATT (e.g. Article XI) only gives rise to the GATT legal theory
of "prima facie nullification or impairment" (such that the
burden would shift to the defending country to show that there
was no nullification or impairment). 3 0 Likewise, even if a
measure is not contrary to any specific GATT provision, a
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to a party is
technically possible under Article XXIII.
In general the "harm" in this context is that the ERA
measures between countries A and B harm country C either because
they divert more exports (and competitive pressures) towards the
C market, or because they cause prices for the products to C to
be increased. However, these cases are seldom brought and have
not yet succeeded. 3 1
Third countries could furthermore be affected by an ERA when
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this implies a warning to their exporters that "unilateral
action" may be taken against them if their exports surge above
certain levels (and especially warnings not to try to take
advantage of the established ERA's with other countries). Such
"warnings" may inhibit potential exporters, even if, in fact, it
is not very likely that the protectionistic action will or can be
taken. 3 2
It is also possible that an ERA with a floor price agreement
may prevent other nations from making certain trade policy
choices. For example, if two nations, A and B, hold between them
a large percentage of world trade in a product that has
significant economies of scale and they agree that B will
undertake not to sell that product in A at not less then $1, then
there is an incentive for B to divert its products to a market
where it can price more cheaply and keep its economies of scale.
The effect of this will be to displace A's products from third
markets. In this case, it will be to the advantage of A to seek
to have B apply the same discipline for products destined for in
third markets as for the A market. In such case the third market
countries might argue that their rights and benefits have been
impaired in that they cannot opt to receive lower priced goods.
This could be especially aggravating when B's exports are
important inputs to downstream production in the third market.
This appears to be part of the basis for an EC GATT complaint
against the US-Japan chips agreement. 3 3
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3. International Supervision or Surveillance
Part of the analysis above has led some to argue that the
only effective policing of these "grey area" measures must be
through an international body, such as the GATT. The GATT
Contracting Parties since 1982 have authorized a semi-annual
exercise of surveying developments in the trading system. As
part of this, the GATT Secretariat now prepares a twice-annual
report which includes, inter alia, a list of these "grey area
measures". The next question, of course, will be what should
happen in the light of such report. Perhaps a Uruguay Round
negotiation on a safeguards code can address this question.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO GATT OBLIGATIONS: ARTICLE XIX, ESCAPE CLAUSE
A. The Policies of Safeguards
While free trade may benefit an importing country as a
whole, it may also harm its domestic industry of the like or
competing products. In order to give the domestic industry of
the importing country time to adjust to the new situation, and
also to lease some of the political pressure against free trade,
Article XIX of the GATT allows contracting parties to take
safeguard measures to temporarily restrain imports of the
particular products and to protect its domestic industry for a
19
short period of time. 3 4
GATT Article XIX includes language which, when a GATT member
can show the article XIX prerequisites are met (not too hard),
allows such member to "suspend" its GATT obligations which
resulted in the injury to the domestic industry. The rules of
GATT so suspended would include GATT Article XI. Indeed,
practice of nations amply confirms that import quotas are used
under GATT XIX despite the prohibition of XI. Thus, nations
could also use "other measures" or export restraints. Since most
ERA measures are probably exercised in the context of a claim for
"safeguards" purposes, i.e. to restrain import competition
affecting an injured competing domestic industry, Article XIX
could be the prime candidate for an analysis to show that ERA
measures are consistent with GATT despite Article XI
prohibitions.
The conceptual problem is that GATT Article KIX allows the
importing nation to suspend its obligation and says nothing about
the exporting nation. Thus at first view, it appears that
Article XIX may not assist either participant to the ERA measure,
since the action (i.e. the-need for the GATT rule suspension) is
performed by the exporting nation, not the importing nation as
Article XIX implies. The question then becomes whether the
language of Article XIX in such circumstance could be interpreted
to authorize the exporting country to take ERA measures, at least
when the importing nation (alleging injury to its industry) has
20
sought and asked for such measures. (This problem is not
confined to the exception of Article XIX, but may occur under
other possible exceptions listed below.)
Perhaps such argument could be sustained. It might go as
follows: If in certain cases a safeguard measure under Article
XIX of the GATT would have been possible, but the countries
involved prefer an ERA, such should be allowed, if it would not
affect third parties. 3 5
B. Selectivity and MFN in Article XIX
One of the important debates of recent years about Article
XIX of GATT, is whether measures under XIX must be imposed in a
manner consistent with M.F.N. principles. 3 6 The principal
argument in favour of selective safeguard measures is that there
is no explicit M.F.N.-requirement in Article XIX, so that this
provision does not prevent the suspension of the M.F.N.-
requirement of Article I as part of the escape clause authority.
Supporters of a non-discriminatory application of safeguards
argue that Article XIX allows the suspension of an obligation in
respect of a product, as opposed to a country, and refer to an
Interpretative Note to Article 40 of the Havana charter, which is
equivalent to Article XIX of the GATT, which provides that
safeguards "must not discriminate against imports from any Member
country". It is also argued that, as a matter of economic
policy, the M.F.N.-requirement is much to be preferred. Clearly
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a specific ERA measure, with just one exporting country (when
more than one exists) would seem to contravene an Article XIX
M.F.N. requirement. Thus, if Article XIX can be deemed to
provide an exception for ERA measures, it may be argued that it
does so only when a network of ERA measures is put in place which
closely approximates an M.F.N. approach (if tariffs or
quantitative restrictions were used instead).
C. Compensation Requirement of GATT Article XIX
Article XIX, paragraph 2, of GATT provides for consultation
between the country that wants to take a safeguard measure and
"the contracting parties having a substantial interest as
exporters of the products concerned". Since paragraph 3 of this
article authorizes a retaliatory response for the affected
parties, it is accepted that the parties entitled to consultation
can accept compensatory concessions by the country that wants to
take a safeguard measure or obtain compensatory withdrawal of
concessions. Providing protection for the domestic industry
through the use of ERA's may tacitly allow avoidance of this
compensation requirement.
Compensation is in practice not always given. 3 7  An
explanation for this may be the costs of a retaliatory withdrawal
of concessions for nations depending on imports and the fact that
as a result of the already extensive tariff reductions made
during the different tariff negotiations rounds, there is often
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very little left to compensate, particularly if the trade item on
which you are taking safeguard action is so huge as is the case
in, for example, steel or automobiles. 3 8
As we noted previously, however, economists have observed
that an ERA may increase the profitability of the exporting
firms. These "monopoly rents" of an ERA thus partly function as
a replacement of the "compensation requirement".
Recently, it has been suggested that auctioning the available
import quotas would enable the importing country's government to
capture these rents, thereby reducing the cost of the
protection. 39  Since these monopoly rents can be an important
inducement for the cooperation of the exporting countries, the
use of such auction quotas may lead the exporting countries to
refuse restricting their imports "voluntarily". Moreover, since
auction quotas would appear to be administered by the importing
country, they would probably amount to "normal" quantitative
import restrictions instead of an ERA. 4 0
V. OTHER GATT EXCEPTIONS
Obviously an ERA may be legally justified under GATT despite
Articles XI, I, XIII, etc. by other measures in GATTE which
provide exceptions. For example, the GATT contracting parties
could always grant a waiver under GATT Article XXV. Balance of
payments exceptions in GATT (including those for developing
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countries) might (subject to an analysis similar to that of the
escape clause above) be extended to exporting country actions
requested by a balance of payments troubled importing country.
Developing countries might likewise make a similar argument under
clauses in Article XVIII. In addition it is theoretically
possible that GATT Grandfather rights under the Protocol of
Provisional Application would apply to a particular export
restraint (in effect prior to the country's entry into GATT) and
thus escape Article XI or XIII challenge. 4 1  (Grandfather rights
do not apply to Article I.)
A few of the more likely GATT exceptions (in addition to the
escape clause previously discussed) are briefly explored below.
A. Price Undertakings and Settlements in Unfair Trade Cases
The GATT rules and the GATT code rules on dumping and
subsidies explicitly allow governments or firms to establish
"price undertakings" (i.e. minimum exporting price assurances) as
a method of suspending on settling an anti-dumping 4 2 or
countervailing duty 4 3 proceeding of an importing country. In
addition, there is arguably "implied" authority in the dumpi.ng
and subsidy rules to enter into at least certain types of
agreements to "settle" or compromise such cases. A number of
measures which might be included in the category of ERA's may be
"justified" under these international rules of exception. If so
justified, relief from both GATT Article XI rules and the non-
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discriminatory principle of GATT Articles I and XIII would be
claimed. It is not clear just how far such exception authority
might extend to justify some ERA's. Clearly this authority
should not be deemed unlimited. More elaboration of this
question however, must await other works.
B. Article XX: General Exceptions
Article XX contains several general exceptions for the
purpose of, for example, the protection of public morals and
health. Generally speaking, the measures taken under this
provision must be "necessary", so that the exception does not
apply if its purpose could be served by a less restrictive
alternative. Moreover, the actions are subject to a "soft MFN-
clause". Although theoretically possible, it is not very likely
that an otherwise illegal ERA will be justified by this article.
C. Article XXI: Security Exceptions
More important may (in practice) be the exception of Article
XXI, based on a country's national security interests. It can be
argued that, for example, a strong steel or automobile industry
is vital to these security interests. 4 4 If so, measures contrary
to specific GATT obligations, taken to protect these interest
could qualify for this exception. Although Article XXI provides
that the measure must be "necessary" for a country's security
interests, it is primarily left to the judgment of the national
25
government whether there exists a less restrictive alternative.
It may, again, be conceptually difficult to apply this
exception to ERA's and exempt the exporting country from its GATT
obligations under Article XI on the basis of the security
interests of the IMPORTING country. However, since under this
provision the importing country would be allowed to take almost
any protective measure, the use of ERA's could in these cases be
defended as a less harmful action than the available
alternatives.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It seems clear that in many cases, export restraint
arrangement (ERA's) are not consistent with GATT rules,
particularly those of GATT Article XI. This is apart from a
number of policy arguments why ERA's have damaging economic
consequences. Yet in analyzing the legal issues, it must be
recognised that there are a number of legal justifications which
can be made under GATT rule exceptions, for certain ERA's. The
most significant such legal exception is that of GATT Article
XIX, the escape clause. Although it is not clear that Article
XIX would legally justify an exporting nations deviation from
GATT Article XI, nevertheless there is at least a plausible
argument that it does so. Clearly ERA's are an important part of
the general "safeguards" subject. This once again points to the
need of a negotiated rule discipline that will explicitly
26
constrain the temptation to frequently use ERA's as a trade
policy measure.
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